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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 6477

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 030541

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [PTER](#) [ASEC](#) [KCRM](#) [ENRG](#) [ETRD](#) [KCOR](#) [PINR](#)

SUBJECT: UPDATED GUIDANCE ON REPORTING RADIATION ALARMS

REF: (A)2007 STATE 162091, (B)2006 STATE 163201 AND
PREVIOUS

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11. (SBU) Summary and Action Request: This guidance cable updates and replaces reftels to reflect national-level policy for reporting radiation alarms and nuclear smuggling. All Embassies and other posts are instructed to initially notify the Department by telephone or e-mail, specifically to the PM/ISO Political-Military Action Team (PMAT) within one hour of receipt of information regarding all significant, special concern or unresolved alarms, or reports of nuclear or radioactive smuggling. The PMAT is staffed 24/7 and is reached at 202-647-9000 or via e-mail: PM_AT_Team@state.gov or PM_AT_Team@state.sgov.gov. Instructions for notifying the PMAT are included in para 9 while significant, special concern and unresolved alarms are defined in para 8. Because of the urgent threat nuclear/radioactive materials may pose to the United States and its interests abroad, even small delays in reporting to Washington may severely impact U.S. security.

12. (SBU) Embassies and all other posts should ensure that all individuals serving as duty officers and all agencies in country are aware of and observe the reporting requirements. Please place a copy of the text of this cable in the duty instructions as well as a note in the Embassy's Emergency Action Plan indicating who to call in the event of a possible illicit trafficking incident. A sample reporting cable is provided in para 14. All cables must carry the following tags: KNNP, MNUC, PARM, KCRM, PTER, ASEC, KCOR, PINR, SIPDIS and appropriate country tags to ensure dissemination to all Washington agencies. In all cases, the Embassy Country Team shall remain the central coordinator for engagement with host governments regarding detector alarms and other potential cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. End Summary and Action request.

Background

13. (SBU) The proliferation of nuclear technology and increased threat from terrorists and transnational criminal networks since 9/11 has intensified U.S. efforts to prevent our adversaries from acquiring nuclear and radiological material. The U.S. continues

to work with international partners to identify and effectively respond to illicitly trafficked nuclear and radioactive material that could be used in terrorist attacks. Previous cases involving radiation detectors demonstrated the need to ensure that all USG personnel under Chief of Mission authority follow these procedures in reporting overseas alarms to Washington to accelerate response times.

¶4. (SBU) Increased reporting speed is crucial for giving the Agencies responsible for U.S. response actions adequate time to plan interdictions and avert threats. Diplomatic action remains the preferred mechanism for responding to and resolving potential threats, but in the absence of a resolution, the U.S. must be prepared to take all necessary means to eliminate a potential threat. Quick reporting of alarms and other significant cases of potential nuclear smuggling ensures maximum time is available for response and operational decisions.

¶5. (SBU) In this context, post reporting serves as a trigger to set inter-agency processes in motion. Although the requirement of notification within one hour may prove challenging for many embassies and posts, it is essential that it be followed. The relevant inter-agency committees have agreed on the necessity of a one hour rule because of the potential of a genuine threat to U.S. security. Post should provide an unclassified notification if secure communication isn't possible. It is of paramount importance that the initial notification be received within one hour regardless of whether communication is by secure or unsecure means.

¶6. (SBU) In some instances (e.g., in case of an airborne cargo that has tripped a detector), it will be necessary for notification to take place even faster - within minutes of post's receipt of information.

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Particularly in situations where a potential threat to U.S. security may be imminent and grave, posts should not wait for more complete information. If in doubt, posts should err on the side of reporting incomplete information sooner, rather than wait for a more complete report later.

¶7. (U) Posts may receive information on smuggling and/or alarms from host governments, walk-ins, other informal channels, or from U.S. government personnel located at foreign ports or border locations. This may include detections by radiation portal monitors (RPMs) and other equipment used or installed by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Container Security Initiative (CSI); Department of Energy's (DOE) Second Line of Defense Program, including the Mega Ports Initiative; State Department's Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program; Department of Defense's (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction program or by other equipment provided through other USG assistance programs. USG personnel who are in-country with these programs have been instructed and are expected to notify the Country Team about detection events that involve special nuclear material, significant radiological material or ones they are unable to adjudicate with their local protocols. In all cases the Embassy Country Team should: 1) follow up on initial reporting of an incident when additional information becomes available; 2) respond to Washington inter-agency requests for additional data expeditiously; and 3) immediately engage with host governments at all appropriate levels upon instruction from the Department.

¶8. (SBU) Significant alarms/incidents include: (1) foreign government requests for assistance, (2) material which cannot be identified, and (3) alarms with no

legitimate cause and/or are indeterminate. Unresolved or indeterminate alarms are alarms in which local protocols and/or technical reachback cannot provide resolution. Special concern alarms involve special nuclear material (SNM) or those in which SNM cannot be ruled out. Specifically, SNM is uranium enriched in the isotopes U-235 or U-233 and Plutonium-239. Other special concern alarms may involve isotopes of concern including Americium-241, Californium-252, Cesium-137, Cobalt-60, Curium-244, Iridium-192, Plutonium-238, Radium-226, and Strontium-90.

Outline of Reporting Procedures

¶9. (SBU) To report all significant, special concern, or unresolved alarms or reports of nuclear or radioactive material smuggling, post officials should contact the Political-Military Action Team (PMAT) within one hour. The PMAT will serve as the communications focal point for all reports of alarms or nuclear smuggling incidents and will notify action officers of any case that arises. The PMAT e-mail address is displayed in the Global Address List as PM-Action Team. The full e-mail address is: PM(underscore)AT(underscore)TEAM(at symbol)state.sgov.gov (classified) or PM(underscore)AT(underscore)TEAM(at symbol)state.gov (unclassified). PMAT is reachable on a 24/7 basis at 202-647-9000.

¶10. (SBU) If feasible, a prompt e-mail from post to the PMAT reduces risk of misunderstanding that may occur in telephonic communications. However, e-mail notifications must be preceded by a phone call from post warning of the impending e-mail, and post must follow-up the e-mail with a telephone call to the PMAT verifying receipt. If a rapid e-mail from post is not practical, telephonic communications will be used to convey the initial report. Until and unless an e-mail response acknowledging receipt of the information by the PMAT is received, Post must continue notification efforts.

¶11. (SBU) No more than two hours after receiving information about a significant, special concern or unresolved alarm or other case of potential nuclear smuggling, Posts are instructed to transmit a report on the incident via front channel cable with the highest precedence available (immediate, flash or critic). In many cases, initial reports to Posts about an alarm or nuclear smuggling incident will not have all information desired by the Department. Posts are requested to not wait to collect all the information desired, but rather to alert Washington immediately upon receipt of (even partial) information. Posts should then follow up with additional information as the Country Team develops it.

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It is essential that all reporting be transmitted via front channel cable and includes the same tags as the initial notification. Because of the time line for certain types of incidents (especially any involving air transport), any delays in notifying Washington could be costly.

Details to Report

¶12. (SBU) The initial e-mail/telephone call and front channel cable should answer the basic questions from the following four categories: (1) physical location and description of material; (2) alarm and detection details (3) host government response; and (4) details on individuals involved. If all the information is not available, post should answer the basic questions with "not yet known" in order to ensure all questions are

reviewed. Please also include the name, credibility, and contact information for all sources and classify as appropriate.

Location and Description of Material

--Is the material currently stationary or transit?
--What type of material (HEU, plutonium, or other radioactive material)?
--What procedures were used to identify the material?
--What isotopes and physical form of the material?
--How much material is involved (in grams, kilograms, curies, millicuries, etc? Spell out units and provide as much detail as possible to avoid misunderstandings).
--Are there detailed descriptions of container, to include: markings, color, size, weight, type of material, how hidden, etc? Include pictures if possible.
--If the material or conveyance is in transit, how is it moving?
--What is the material's intended destination and shipping route? Please note (e.g., between international ports, directly to the US, via other foreign ports to the US)?
--Is there a manifest or other shipping information associated with the conveyance?
--Who is the supplier of the material and/or origination point of material?

Alarm and Detection Details

--What is the source of the report?
--What is the date and time of alarm or incident?
--If it was a radiation alarm, include basic technical data such as the type of alarm (Gamma/Neutron/Both), the dose rates, the data log from a portal monitor, and the Gamma energy spectrum.
--Is a separate email of a spectral file available?
--What else if anything was being smuggled with the material?
--What is the specific place where alarm or incident occurred?
--If a radiation detector was used, what was the distance from the radiation detector to the object(s) being measured and what was the detector type (make and model)? Please also note the placement of the detector. When gamma spectral data is provided, a calibration spectrum and a background spectrum should always be provided.

Host Government Response

--Who is physically responsible for the material presently?
--How is it secured?
--Are the appropriate authorities capable or willing to secure the material?
--How does the host government plan to dispose of the material?
--Who knows about the material (i.e. press)?
--If seized on a border, does the neighboring government know?
--Does the IAEA know or does host government intend to inform the IAEA in the near future?
--Which agency(ies) have the lead in investigating the

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case?

--Have any criminal charges been issued against the

people involved in the incident? Are the people involved in prison? What are the next steps in the legal process?

Details on Individuals Involved

--Please provide biographical information for all individuals involved in the incident, to include: name, age, phone number, home address, passport number, employment information, and bank account information.
--Are there indications that other individuals besides those apprehended by authorities were involved in the incident? What is that status of the host country's efforts to locate these people?
--Did the individuals involved claim access to additional material, or to sensitive facilities that store nuclear and/or radiological material?
--Do the individuals involved have any connections to government officials, police/security agencies, or intelligence agencies? Do they have connections to known criminal groups?

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Handling Offers of Nuclear or Other Radioactive Materials

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¶13. (SBU) Previous reftels on handling offers of nuclear or radioactive material remain unchanged. If post is approached by an individual or group with offers to sell or otherwise provide nuclear or radiological materials, or if post is informed of such an offer to another party, USG personnel should:

--NOT involve USG personnel in a sting or similar operation involving the sale, purchase, or brokerage of alleged nuclear or radiological material. If assistance to host government undercover operations is required, authorization must be granted by Washington. In such cases, response assets are available on short notice.

--NOT accept or examine any alleged nuclear or radioactive material. Should a walk-in arrive with a package or container of purported nuclear or radioactive material, the walk-in should be instructed to remove the object from the premises immediately.

--NOT expose U.S. facilities or their personnel to potentially hazardous materials. Technical support is available to assist posts in determining if a suspect material is hazardous (see para 9-11 for reporting procedures).

--Collect all available information (see para 12) on the walk-in or incident and report to Washington immediately, using the sample cable in para 14.

--Obtain contact information from person conveying the offer in order to pass information to local authorities and Washington.

--Share the information with appropriate local authorities only after the Country Team and Washington agencies have reviewed the information provided by the walk-in.

--Refrain from initiating or agreeing to repeated contact without first seeking guidance from Washington.

FORMAT FOR POST REPORTING

¶14. (SBU) Below is a sample cable for post's review. Cables must carry the following tags: KNNP, MNUC, PARM,

KCRM, PTER, ASEC, KCOR, PINR and appropriate country tags. They should include the lowest appropriate classification and highest possible precedence. Cables should also contain the appropriate captions for classification and include SIPDIS as a distribution point. All reporting must be transmitted via front channel cable and include all tags indicated in the initial notification. This format will route all messages to the following addressees: CIA, DHS (CBP, DNDO, OI&A), DOE, DOD, JCS, FBI, NRC, OSTP (the White

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House Science Office), NSA, DIA and NSC and other agencies. Within the department, automatic electronic distribution is made to ISN/WMDT, ISN/CPI, the country desk, T, DS, INR, IO/T, INR/SPM, PM/ISO, PMAT, S/CT, INL, S/P and S/ES-O.
(SBU) Begin Sample Cable:

To: SECSTATE

FOR STATE ISN/WMDT AND PM/ISO/PMAT (24/7)

SIPDIS

Tags: KNNP, MNUC, PARM, KCRM, PTER, PREL, ASEC, PINR
[country tag]

Subject: Nuclear Smuggling Incident/Portal Detection at
[Insert Location]

Reference: State XXXXX

1. (SBU) Post wishes to alert the Department and Washington agencies per reftel that it has received a report indicating a potential incident of illicit trafficking in nuclear and/or radiological materials. This report came to post's attention via [e.g., host government report; detector alarm, etc.] Information concerning this report was relayed by [e-mail and telephone] to PMAT at [time] on [date].

2. Details of the incident follow:

Location and Description of Material

- A) Is the material currently stationary or transit?
- B) What type of material (HEU, plutonium, or other radioactive material)?
- C) What procedures were used to identify the material?
- D) What isotopes and physical form of the material?
- E) How much material is involved (in grams, kilograms, curies, millicuries, etc? Spell out units and provide as much detail as possible to avoid misunderstandings)?
- F) Are there detailed descriptions of container, to include: markings, color, size, weight, type of material, how hidden, etc. Include pictures if possible.
- G) If the material or conveyance is in transit, how is it moving?
- H) What is the material's intended destination and shipping route? Please note (e.g., between international ports, directly to the US, via other foreign ports to the US)?
- I) Is there a manifest or other shipping information associated with the conveyance?
- J) Who is the supplier of the material and/or origination point of material?

Alarm and Detection Details

- K) What is the source of the report?
- L) What is the date and time of alarm or incident?

M) If it was a radiation alarm, include basic technical data such as the type of alarm (Gamma/Neutron/Both), the dose rates, the data log from a portal monitor, and the Gamma energy spectrum.
N) Is a separate email of a spectral file available?
O) What else if anything was being smuggled with the material?
P) What is the specific place where alarm or incident occurred?
Q) If a radiation detector was used, what was the distance from the radiation detector to the object(s) being measured and what was the detector type (make and model)? Please also note the placement of the detector. When gamma spectral data is provided, a calibration spectrum and a background spectrum should always be provided.

Host Government Response

R) Who is physically responsible for the material presently?
S) How is it secured?
T) Are the appropriate authorities capable or willing to

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secure the material?
U) How does the host government plan to dispose of the material?
V) Who knows about the material (i.e. press)?
W) If seized on a border, does the neighboring government know?
X) Does the IAEA know or does host government intend to inform the IAEA in the near future?
Y) Which agency(ies) have the lead in investigating the case?
Z) Have any criminal charges been issued against the people involved in the incident? Are the people involved in prison? What are the next steps in the legal process?

Details on Individuals Involved

AA) Please provide biographical information for all individuals involved in the incident, to include: name, age, phone number, home address, passport number, employment information, and bank account information.
BB) Are there indications that other individuals besides those apprehended by authorities were involved in the incident? What is that status of the host country's efforts to locate these people?
CC) Did the individuals involved claim access to additional material, or to sensitive facilities that store nuclear and/or radiological material?
DD) Do the individuals involved have any connections to government officials, police/security agencies, or intelligence agencies? Do they have connections to known criminal groups?

13. (SBU) Action officer at post for handling incident is [fill in name], reachable via [telephone number] and [email].

CLINTON

End Sample Cable.

15. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
CLINTON